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Abstract—In the telecommunication world, competition among
providers to attract and keep customers is fierce. On the other
hand customers churn between providers due to better prices,
better reputation or better services. We propose in this paper
to study the price war between two providers in the case where
users’ decisions are modeled by a Markov chain, with price-
dependent transition rates. Each provider is assumed to look
for a maximized revenue, which depends on the strategy of the
competitor. Therefore, using the framework of non-cooperative
game theory, we show how the price war can be analyzed and
show the influence of various parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The migration of customers from a service provider to
another, a.k.a. as churn, has become a relevant phenomenon
since the liberalization of telecommunications service and the
ensuing proliferation of network operators. Churn is especially
large in mobile networks, where yearly migration rates as
high as 25% are not uncommon [1]. The migration of each
customer, to the benefit of another service provider, implies
both the loss of the stream of future revenues associated to
that customer and of the acquisition cost. Service providers
are therefore very keen on retaining their customers as well
as on attracting new ones. In doing so they can rely both on
preventive and on reactive strategies. An example of the latter
is given by unfair practices such as the malicious introduction
of delays in the migration process [2] [3]. Preventive strategies
rely instead on the identification of the factors having a
major influence on the churning decision (the churn deter-
minants) [4] [5] and on successive actions on those factors.
Among the identified churn determinants, price plays the
most relevant role. Price always appears as a major factor:
in the context of mobile number portability (a mechanism
allowing to switch provider with minimal discontinuity, since
the telephone number is retained), price is stated as a key
element in spurring churn [6]. Another example is provided
in [7], where retention and attrition phenomena are studied in
an experimental setting by proposing different pricing plans
to test customers. We can then expect that providers may
compete for retaining customers by acting primarily on price.
In this paper we propose a model for the competition among
service providers based on price, the competition being here
limited to two service providers. To our knowledge, it is
the first time that such a competition model is introduced
in telecommunications to model the price war. While most
research efforts on telecommunication pricing are concerned
with congestion externality for usage-based pricing [8], here
we focus more on subscription-fee based pricing, where users
are charged for the amount of time they stay with a provider,
regardless of their usage (e.g., the Internet subscription fee
incorporated in most of the current pricing packages). Our
model makes use of a Markov chain to mimic the churn be-
haviour of a customer in terms of prices and other parameters.
Basically, the user can be with any of the providers or none
of them if not satisfied with their combination of price and
services. The per-user revenue of each provider can then be
easily computed from steady-state probabilities, considering a
single user without loss of generality. Indeed, assuming that
customers behave independently and according to the same
Markov chain, the expected revenue of providers is exactly
the expected revenue per customer times the total population.
Those state probabilities depending on both prices, so are the
revenues of providers. As a consequence, the natural frame-
work for analyzing the competition between providers seeking
to maximize their revenue is non-cooperative game theory. We
show how to solve this game, and illustrate the influence of
parameters such as impact of other churn determinants, and
(social or financial) cost for not getting any service due to
excessive prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
Markov chain model representing the user behaviour and
computes the associated steady-state probabilities. Section III
explains in full generality why non-cooperative come into play
and how it can be solved, either analytically or numerically.
Section IV then shows how, in a simplified setting, the game
can be solved analytically. Section V on the other hand makes
use of a description of rates issued from logit models. In
this case, a numerical analysis is performed. In addition, we
investigate the sensitivity of the resulting equilibria to the
degree of asymmetry between the two providers in attracting
customers and to the relevance of the price factor for the
customers. Finally, Section VI describes our conclusions.
II. MARKOV CHAIN MODEL OF USERS’ BEHAVIOR
We assume that the behavior of a customer is represented
by the continuous time Markov chain1 that is depicted in
1We therefore implicitely assume that all events leading to a state change
occur after an exponentially distributed time.
Q :=
 −2α α αλ10(p1, p2) −(λ10(p1, p2) + λ12(p1, p2)) λ12(p1, p2)
λ20(p1, p2) λ21(p1, p2) −(λ20(p1, p2) + λ21(p1, p2))
 .
Figure 2: Infinitesimal generator of the Markov chain
Figure 12. Here state 1 means that the customer is with
provider 1, state 2 that he is with provider 2 and state 0 that
he does not use any service. The parameter α is a constant
rate independent of prices. Remark on the other hand that
other rates will be considered in the numerical section, but
the resulting steady-state probabilities will be computed in the
same way. The resulting infinitesimal generator Q is given in
1 0 2
λ10(p1, p2) α
λ20(p1, p2)α
λ12(p1, p2)
λ21(p1, p2)
Figure 1: Continuous time Markov chain model of the cus-
tomer’s switching behaviour
Figure 2. From standard Markov chain analysis, the steady-
state probabilities for each of the three states grouped in the
row vector pi = (pii)i=0,...,2 exist and are given by the solution
of equations
piQ = 0,
2∑
i=0
pii = 1.
If
c = α (2λ12(p1, p2) + 2λ21(p1, p2) + λ10(p1, p2) + λ20(p1, p2))
+λ10(p1, p2)λ21(p1, p2) + λ20(p1, p2)λ12(p1, p2)
+λ10(p1, p2)λ20(p1, p2),
we have
pi0 =
λ10(p1, p2)λ21(p1, p2) + λ10(p1, p2)λ20(p1, p2)
c
+
λ12(p1, p2)λ20(p1, p2)
c
pi1 =
(λ20(p1, p2) + 2λ12(p1, p2))α
c
pi2 =
α (λ10(p1, p2) + 2λ21(p1, p2))
c
.
2Remark that other distributions for sojourn times can be used as well. In
that case the model requires to be handled by simulation, while here steady-
state probabilities can be computed analytically and as a consequence the
game is solved using simple numerical analysis tools.
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME FROM THE PROVIDERS’
SIDE
The previous section describes the behaviour of a customer
as a function of prices set by providers. The question is now to
define the best pricing strategy for each provider knowing that
behaviour. We therefore have a so-called Stackelberg game [9],
with leaders (the providers) choosing their prices knowing the
consequences they would have on users’ behaviour, and the
followers (the users) whose reaction is a direct consequence
of providers’prices. This means that providers play first, but
using backward induction, they anticipate the resulting strategy
of end users who actually make the last move.
It is important to stress that our model, considering a single
customer in front of two providers, is sufficient if assuming
that each user has a behaviour independent of others’. The case
of N users can then indeed be easily derived by multiplying
the expected revenue by N (thanks to the independence).
In the first step of the Stackelberg game, each provider tries
to maximize its revenue. There is a trade-off to be analyzed
between the fact that increasing the price will increase the
revenue per customer, but on the other hand potentially reduce
the number of customers (i.e., the probability of having the
user as customer in our case). The revenue per customer Ri
for provider i ∈ {1, 2} is therefore expressed formally as the
price charged multiplied by the probability that this customers
is indeed with provider i, i.e., Ri = pipii ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, or more
exactly using the expressions for the steady-state probabilities
of the Markov chain:
R1(p1, p2) = p1
α (λ20(p1, p2) + 2λ12(p1, p2))
c
R2(p1, p2) = p2
α (λ10(p1, p2) + 2λ21(p1, p2))
c
.
From those expressions, it is clear that the revenue of a
provider depends on the price strategy of the concurrent.
Indeed, steady-state probabilities are functions of rates which
themselves depend on both prices. As a consequence, this
fits the framework of non-cooperative game theory [9]. Each
provider strives to find its best strategy, i.e., its price maximiz-
ing its revenue, which can be modified by the strategy of the
competitor. The solution concept is that of a Nash equilibrium:
a Nash equilibrium is a price profile (p∗1, p
∗
2) such that no
provider can unilaterally increase its revenue, i.e.,
R1(p∗1, p
∗
2) = max
p1≥0
R1(p1, p∗2)
R2(p∗1, p
∗
2) = max
p2≥0
R2(p∗1, p2).
In general the existence of a Nash equilibrium cannot be en-
sured without assumptions, nor its uniqueness when existence
is shown. In the case where rate functions are simple enough in
terms of prices, we may find the form of the Nash equilibria
analytically (see next section). Otherwise, the computations
can be performed numerically using the following algorithm.
We define the best response of each provider as a function of
the strategy of its opponent by
BR1(p2) := argmax
p1≥0
R1(p1, p2) and
BR2(p1) := argmax
p2≥0
R2(p1, p2).
In this setting, a Nash equilibrium is just a point (p∗1, p
∗
2) such
that BR1(p∗2) = p
∗
1 and BR1(p
∗
1) = p
∗
2 (if best responses
are not unique, it means that p∗1 in the set of best responses
when provider’s price is p∗2, and reciprocally). Algorithm 1
describes how to algorithmically and graphically determine
Nash equilibria (if any)
Alg. 1 Graphically finding the Nash equilibria of the game
Input: transition rates of the Markov chain in Figure 1, as
functions of prices p1 and p2.
1) For all possible values of p2 ≥ 0, find the set BR1(p2)
of p1 values maximizing R1(p1, p2).
2) For all possible values of p1 ≥ 0, find the set BR2(p1)
of p2 values maximizing R2(p1, p2).
3) On a same graphic, plot the best response functions
p1 = BR1(p2) and p2 = BR2(p1), as illustrated
Figure 3.
4) The set of Nash equilibria is the (possibly empty) set
of intersection points of those functions.
Two practical remarks can be made:
• Instead of assuming the set [0,∞) for each price, we will
limit ourselves to [0, pmax] since customers are unlikely
to come to the provider if price is too high.
• When analytical derivation cannot be performed and
solved to determine the best response functions, only a
finite number of values can be tried in practice in each
case, and the best responses determined at these points,
and the solution investigated on the corresponding lattice.
IV. ANALYSIS FOR SPECIFIC BUT REALISTIC RATES
This section is dedicated to the case where rates of the
Markov chain are simple, but realistic enough, to derive analyt-
ical expressions for the Nash equilibria. We more specifically
assume that
λ10(p1, p2) = p1
λ20(p1, p2) = p2
λ12(p1, p2) = ζp1/p2
λ21(p1, p2) = p2/p1,
with ζ a strictly positive real number. Expressions for λ10 and
λ20 mean that a customer is more likely to leave a provider
p1
p2
BR1(p2)
BR2(p1)
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 3: Graphical determination of Nash equilibria. Two
solutions here (circled points).
for no service if its price is high, and depend linearly (and
only) on the price at the incumbent provider. Values for λ12
and λ12 mean that swapping between providers depend on the
ratios of prices. The insertion of parameter a is to introduce
some asymmetry, because provider 1 may have a better (worse)
reputation and it is therefore less (more) likely to be left for
provider 2 when ζ < 1 (ζ > 1).
In that case, we end up, after simple computations, with
R1 =
αp22p1(p1 + 2)
2αp22 + (α+ 1)p2p
2
1 + (1 + α)p1p
2
2 + p
2
1p
2
2 + 2ζαp
2
1
R2 =
αp21p2(p2 + 2ζ)
2αp22 + (α+ 1)p2p
2
1 + (1 + α)p1p
2
2 + p
2
1p
2
2 + 2ζαp
2
1
.
In order to determine the existence of a Nash equilibrium,
we compute the derivatives. Using D = 2αp22+(α+1)p2p
2
1+
(1 + α)p1p22 + p
2
1p
2
2 + 2ζαp
2
1, we have
∂R1
∂p1
= −αp22
[
p21((1− α)p22 + 2(α+ ζ)p2 + 4ζα)
D2
+
p1(−4αp22) + (−4αp22)
D2
]
∂R2
∂p2
= αp21
[
p22(−2ζ(1 + α)p1 + (α− ζ)p21 − 4ζα)
D2
+
p2(4ζαp
2
1) + (4ζ
2αp21)
D2
]
.
Note that (p1 = 0, p2 = 0) is always a solution of the
system ∂R1∂p1 = 0 and
∂R2
∂p2
= 0, and a Nash equilibrium. On
the other hand, equating the numerators to zero, any solution
with (p1, p2) 6= (0, 0), i.e., any non-degenerate strictly positive
and finite Nash equilibrium, then solves the system of second
degree equations
p21((1− α)p22 + 2(α+ ζ)p2 + 4ζα)
+p1(−4αp22) + (−4αp22) = 0 (1)
p22(−2ζ(1 + α)p1 + (α− ζ)p21 − 4ζα)
+p2(4ζαp21) + (4ζ
2αp21) = 0. (2)
The unique strictly positive solution of this system is given by
p1 = −2
α
(−ζ2 + ζ + α2ζ − α2)
ζα3 − 2α2ζ − α2 + 3ζα− a2 (3)
p2 = 2
ζα
(−ζ2 + ζ + α2ζ − α2)
3ζ2α− ζ2 − ζ2α2 − 2α2ζ + α3 , (4)
provided those values are positive. At most one Nash equilib-
rium with strictly positive prices is possible in that case.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Churn rates and prices in the literature
In Section II the transition rates that mark the passage from
a provider to the other are shown to depend on the prices
offered by the providers and Section IV illustrates that, in
very simplified cases, the Nash equilibrium can be obtained
analytically, though not easily. In order to adopt a model
as close as possible to reality, we briefly review the related
literature on the mathematical relationship between churn rates
and prices in this sub-section, that which will be adopted
during our numerical analysis.
Significant efforts have been spent to identify the most
relevant factors in determining churn (often named churn
determinants). In order to model the relationship between
prices and churn rates in a quantitative fashion both parametric
and non-parametric approaches have been proposed in the
literature. Among the non-parametric approaches we can cite
[10], where neural networks and decision trees are employed,
and [11] where a novel evolutionary learning algorithm is
proposed. Since we need a closed form relationship here
we are more interested in parametric approaches. The most
widespread model adopted in the literature to represent that
relationship is the logit model, which employs a logistic
probability distribution function [12] [13] [14]. The argument
of the logistic function is a linear function of a number
of churn determinants. The most general expression of the
probability that a user churns in the next period (e.g., a year
as in [12]) is then
Pchurn =
1
1 + e−I
, (5)
where I is the logit factor, in turn given by
I =
n∑
i=1
βiXi, (6)
where Xi, i = 1, . . . , n are the explanatory variables (churn
determinants) and βi, i = 1, . . . , n, are the coefficients
representing the relative importance of those determinants. In
this paper we have focussed on the price factor, so that we
can group the impact of the other churn determinants in the
overall term γ, arriving at the simpler expression
Pchurn =
1
1 + γe−βp1/p2
(7)
for the probability that in the specified period the user switches
from Provider 1 to Provider 2. We may employ that expression
for a time period of any duration, so we can adopt it in the
Markov chain model described in Section II. We note that,
according to expression (7), there is a non zero probability,
namely Pchurn = 11+γ , that the user switches provider due to
the ensemble of other dissatisfaction factors, even when the
service offered by the losing provider is free.
B. Transition rates
The transition rates that we assume now are chosen to reflect
the conclusions of the previous subsection. However, the data
and conclusions drawn from the literature do not provide us
with a complete description of all the transition rates we need,
in particular the state where users do not subscribe to the
service is not encompassed in previous results. Moreover, the
literature considers discretized time, whereas we focus here
on a continuous-time model.
That latter difficulty is addressed here by assuming that
time periods considered in Subsection V-A, are short with
respect to the mean sojourn time in a given state. This implies
that the discrete time transition probabilities are approximately
the continuous-time transition rates multiplied by the period
duration. Consequently, we would like to consider transition
rates from state i ∈ {1, 2} to state j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i} of the
form κ
1+γie
−βpi/pj , where κ > 0 represents the inverse of
the period duration. Since β represents the user sensitivity to
prices, we consider it is the same for the different states of
the model. However, such an expression would imply that all
transition rates be in an interval [κ/(1 + γi), κ] regardless of
the price values. This is not realistic, since it would imply that
a provider could ensure an arbitrarily large revenue by setting
a very large price. We therefore need that the transition rates
to a provider i tend to 0 and/or that the rates from provider
i tend to ∞, when pi →∞. To that end, we slightly modify
the previous expression, and take transition rates of the form
λij(pi, pj) =
κ
γie−βpi/pj
=
κ
γi
eβpi/pj , (8)
We introduce asymmetry among providers through the pa-
rameter γi: as explained before, this parameter encompasses
the reasons other than price (e.g., Quality of Service, reputa-
tion, ...), why a user should leave state i.
We propose to address the former difficulty (no hints regard-
ing the transitions to/from our state 0) by assuming that being
in state 0 corresponds to perceiving a cost p0, that reflects
the inconvenience for not benefitting from the service. We
therefore treat state 0 as the two other states, but considering
p0 as a fixed value instead of a strategic variable. As a result,
the transition rate we assume from any state i ∈ {0, 1, 2} to
state j ∈ {0, 1, 2} \ {i} is given by (8).
The model parameters that we consider are then:
• the user sensitivity to price β,
• the likeliness γi to stay in current state i, i = 0, 1, 2,
• the inverse of period duration κ (this parameter should
not play a role in our model, since by a time unit change
we can assume κ = 1),
• the user perceived cost p0 for not benefitting from the
service.
C. Numerical analysis of the game
In this subsection, we suggest to study the game while
considering the previous expressions of the transition rates.
The dependence of those rates on provider prices are too
complicated to solve the problem analytically, therefore we
perform here a numerical study. Unless otherwise stated, the
parameter values considered in this section are the following:
p0 = 1, κ = 1, β = 0.5, γ1 = 1, γ2 = 2, γ0 = 1. We will refer
to this set of parameter values as S.
Figure 4 plots the steady-state revenue R1 of provider 1
when its price p1 varies, for different values of the opponent
price p2. We remark that the revenue of provider 1 is first
p2 = 3
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Figure 4: Provider 1 revenue versus p1 for fixed p2.
increasing, then decreasing in p1. However, this is not always
the case: for some parameter values, the revenue of a provider
as a function of its price may have two local maxima, and
depending on the opponent’s price, the first or the second local
optimum is a global one. This is exemplified in Figure 5 for
γ2 = 7 and the other parameter values in S. Nevertheless, it
appears that the revenue of provider 1 tends to 0 as its price
tends to infinity, which implies that there exists a finite price
p1 maximizing R1. That revenue-maximizing price constitutes
the best reply of provider 1 to the price set by provider 2.
As explained in Section III, plotting the best-reply curves
of both providers on the same graph highlights the Nash
equilibria of the game. Those curves are shown in Figure 6
for the parameter values in S. Figure 6 shows that there
are two Nash equilibria of the game, namely (0, 0) and
p∗ ≈ (2.29, 2.84). However, we notice that (0, 0) is not a
satisfying situation, since it brings no revenue to the providers,
and moreover it is not a stable Nash equilibrium: if any of the
two providers slightly deviates from that situation by setting a
strictly positive price, then successive best replies lead to the
other (stable) Nash equilibrium p∗. We will consequently focus
on that equilibrium in the following, when it exists. Indeed,
notice that as the example of Figure 5 illustrates, the best
reply correspondence p2 7→ BR1(p2) may not be continuous
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Figure 5: Provider 1 revenue versus p1 for fixed p2 and γ2 = 7
(other parameters taken from S).
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Figure 6: Best-reply curves of both providers.
due to the fact that the global maximum can switch from
one local maximum to the other. Figure 7 plots the best-
reply correspondences with the same parameter values as for
Figure 5. Interestingly, for that set of value there are two stable
Nash equilibrium: one around (p1, p2) = (0.14, 0.7) and the
other one near (p1, p2) = (2, 3.9). Nevertheless, those cases
were rarely met in our numerical computations, and were not
met with the “reasonable” values that we used.
D. Influence of the parameter p0
In Subsection V-B we have interpreted p0 as the user
perceived cost for not benefitting from the service. When
the service in question concerns a rapidly time-evolving sec-
tor such as telecommunications, it is very likely that this
perceived cost p0 changes. For example, Internet access or
cellular telephony are now almost priceless services for many
users, because those tools are extensively used and becoming
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Figure 7: Best-reply curves of both providers when γ2 = 7
(other parameter values taken from S).
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Figure 8: Nash equilibrium prices when the no-service cost p0
varies.
mandatory for regular business. This was not the case at the
very beginning of those technologies. On the other hand,
some services/technologies can lose value because they get
abandoned or can be replaced by other ones. Services with
higher importance/impact can therefore be modeled by a larger
p0
For those reasons, we investigate now the effect of the no-
service cost p0 on the outcomes of the game. We assume that
the variations of p0 are on a longer time scale than the game
on prices and user behavior, so that we still compute the Nash
equilibrium of the pricing game as described in the previous
subsection.
Figure 8 plots the Nash equilibrium prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) versus
p0, while the corresponding user repartition at steady-state is
plotted in Figure 9. We remark that the steady-state distribu-
tion (again, at Nash equilibrium depending on p0) is almost
constant when p0 varies, and equilibrium prices increase close
to linearly with p0. Therefore, if providers are aware of an
increase in p0, they should raise their prices correspondingly
to benefit from the increased value of the service. Interestingly,
this price increase compensates the service value increase from
the point of view of the users, since the proportion of users
choosing the service or not is unchanged.
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Figure 9: User repartition at Nash equilibrium when the no-
service cost p0 varies.
E. Influence of the price sensitivity β
We study here the effect of the parameter β, that repre-
sented users’ sensitivities to price differences between the
different states of the Markov chain. When β increases, we
expect providers to decrease their prices so as to attract more
efficiently a maximum of customers. The Nash equilibrium
prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) when β varies are shown in Figure 10. We
give the corresponding user repartition and provider revenues
in Figure 11 and 12, respectively. It appears that when the
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Figure 10: Nash equilibrium prices when β varies.
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Figure 11: Steady-state user repartition at Nash equilibrium
when β varies.
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Figure 12: Provider revenues at Nash equilibrium when β
varies.
price sensitivity exceeds a given threshold (that is around
0.85), providers engage in a price war that makes their price
tend to 0, and they finally get no revenue from providing the
service. This benefits users who all end up with one of the two
providers. Below that threshold, an increased price sensitivity
already implies a provider price reduction, and a revenue
decrease for them. Remark also that provider 2, being more
attractive than its opponent (since γ2 > γ1 in our parameter
values), takes benefit of that advantage by setting higher prices.
F. Influence of the asymmetry between providers
In our model, providers only differ for their parameter γi,
that reflects the user likeliness to stay with him: from (8), a
larger γi means lower transition rates to the other states of
the Markov chain. That asymmetry between providers may
for example come from users being more reluctant to leave
the incumbent operator than another one, because they trust
less the newly-arrived operators in terms of honesty and/or
QoS. Therefore, those parameters γi may vary due to word
of mouth, advertisement, and are consequently difficult to
evaluate.
We therefore investigate here the influence of the asymmetry
in providers’ γi value. To do so, we fix all values but γ2
from the parameter set S, and make γ2 vary. We assume that
provider 2 is the one with an advantage, i.e. γ2 ≥ γ1. In
Figures 13, 14, and 15, we respectively plot the Nash prices,
user repartition and provider revenues versus 1/γ2 (therefore
abscissa also gives the ratio γ1/γ2). Notice that the curves are
only given for the values of 1/γ2 > 0.18, because for values
below that threshold the game may have several stable Nash
equilibria (as in the case shown in Figure 7) and we cannot
predict which one will be chosen. Nevertheless, those extreme
values may seem unrealistic, since they mean an asymmetry
magnitude larger than 5.
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Figure 13: Nash equilibrium prices when 1/γ2 varies.
We remark that provider 2 takes benefit from his advantage
by setting a higher price than his opponent, while still having
more customers. That difference in price and user repartition
increases with the game asymmetry, and vanishes when the
game becomes symmetric, i.e. when γ2 tends to 1.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a competition game model,
where providers take into account the user churn behavior to
determine the price they fix for the service, so as to maximize
their steady-state revenue. Through a numerical analysis, we
remarked that the game has a Nash equilibrium, that might not
be unique if the asymmetry between providers is very large.
When providers are not too different in terms of attractivity
or reputation, we investigate the effect of user sensitivity to
prices (that is seen to exacerbate the price war), and the effect
of an increase in the need for the service (that is observed to
benefit only to providers).
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Figure 14: Steady-state user repartition at Nash equilibrium
when 1/γ2 varies.
One interesting direction for future work is to have a
different approach as to the considered time scales. In this
paper, we have considered several time scales: at the smallest
time scale users are assumed to react to prices, while those
prices are fixed at a larger time scale, reasoning on the user
behavior steady-state outcome. Finally, the value of the service
may vary at an even larger time scale. Those assumptions
can be justified, but it would also be interesting to relax
them, for example by considering the user dynamics within
the pricing game: an incumbent provider may start the game
with more customers than his opponent, and may therefore be
better off beginning with a large price since not all users will
immediately churn to the opponent. Likewise, the competitor
may have an incentive to start with low prices so as to attract
customers, before possibly raising its price.
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Figure 15: Provider revenues at Nash equilibrium when 1/γ2
varies.
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